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Article 5

AN "EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY"? AEDPA
AND ERROR DETECTION IN CAPITAL CASES*

James S. Lzebmant

INTRODUCTION

On June 11, 2001, the United States of America
executed Timothy McVeigh.1 Dwarfed among the many
©2001 James S. Liebman. All Rights Reserved.
t Simon H. Rifkin Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
I See Execution Was "Justice,"USA TODAY, June 12, 2001, at D7 (reprinting
President George Bush's statement on Timothy McVeigh's execution).
This Article is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the Brooklyn Law
School Edward V Sparer Public Interest Law Fellowship Symposium on April 5, 2001.
At that point, McVeigh was forty days away from his scheduled execution on May 16,
2001. Five days before that execution, however, the FBI revealed that it had discovered
thousands of pages of documents that the Government improperly had failed to turn
over to McVeigh and his lawyers before trial. This "monumental foul-up," to quote Tom
Brokaw on the evening news the mght the FBI announced its discovery, led McVeigh's
execution, which had been the subject of a monumental build-up by the media, to be
postponed for close to a month. See NBC News: Nightly News, Newscast.- Justice
DepartmentPostpones Timothy McVeigh Execution (NBC television broadcast, May 11,
2001), available at 2001 WL 24022866:
TOM BROKAW, anchor: In Terre Haute, Indiana tonight, Timothy
McVeigh, the man who described the dead children of Oklahoma City
as, quote, "collateral damage," that Timothy McVeigh has had his life
extended. His execution as the Oklahoma City bomber has been
postponed until June lth as a result of a monumental foul-up by the
FBI. McVeigh's defense lawyers failed to get thousands of pages of
evidence from the FBI. And so Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered
the postponement. McVeigh's lawyers also say their client might now
fight execution.
Although up to that point, McVeigh had asked to waive all legal proceedings
and be executed, the disclosure of the FBI documents led him to request a further stay
of execution to give him time to litigate issues he claimed were presented by the
documents. After a federal judge refused the request and a court of appeals panel
affirmed the decision, McVeigh again decided to forgo all further legal challenges to his
execution, see Jo Thomas, McVeigh Preparesfor Death and Awaits Move from Cell,

BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67- 2

unspeakable evils that Mr. McVeigh wrought is a speakable
one I will address here, namely, the so-called Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").2
Abbreviated, AEDPA's political history is as follows: In
November 1994, the "Gingrich Congress" was elected on its
Contract with America platform. One of the planks of that
platform-one of the few that actually ended up passing
Congress-was the so-called "Effective Death Penalty Act."
That proposal had little to do with the death penalty and,
originally, nothing to do with terrorism. What it instead
proposed were drastic cuts in federal habeas corpus review of
capital and non-capital criminal convictions.
First introduced in January 1995, the bill was moving
through Congress no more quickly than any other part of the
Contract when, on April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh's bomb
exploded in front of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City The blast killed 168 people, including nineteen children
in a day care center at ground zero. Within hours, McVeigh
was spotted careening down an Oklahoma interstate highway
without license plates, and arrested. Within days, the
President (quite publicly and explicitly) and most other
Americans (rather more quietly) had resolved that McVeigh's
punishment must be death, and hunkered down to await the
imposition and execution of that verdict. And within weeks,
Republicans in both Houses of Congress had attached the
Effective Death Penalty Act to a version of a Clinton
administration proposal for an Antiterrorism Act, and renamed
the resulting proposal the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.3 I discuss below the cynicism of that particular

N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A7, which was carried out according to his wishes on June
11, 2001. See Rick Bragg, McVeigh Dies for Oklahoma City Blast, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2001, at Ai.
2 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in amendments to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (1996))
[hereinafter AEDPA].
3 For a useful discussion of this and other aspects of AEDPA's legislative
history, see Larry W Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 381, 422-42 (1996). See also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes
and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
and the Prison LitigationReform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-22 (1997) (providing additional
discussion of AEDPA's legislative history).
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shotgun political marriage, but its effect was to set the
legislative sled careening down the hill.
AEDPA's death penalty provisions were radical, and the
bill qickly encountered opposition. The Senate scheduled the
key vote on a bipartisan amendment to strike the worst aspects
of the death penalty provisions for June 7, 1995. Those
amendments were strongly supported by William Cohen, the
Republican Senator from Maine, and they had enough
Republican support to pass, if the Senate Democrats held
firm. 4 On the evening of June 6, 1995, however, President
Clinton went on CNN talk show Larry King Lwe and
announced that he was satisfied with the un-amended bill. 5
The next day, five Democratic Senators defected, and the
6
amendments were defeated by a four vote margin.
When the bill encountered similar resistance in the
House in the spring of 1996, President Clinton again came to
its rescue, demanding its passage by the April 19 anmversary
of McVelgh's bombing.7 Again, wavering Democrats obliged the
President, though they missed his deadline by a week.
AEDPA, thus, was the product of the bizarre alignment
of three ill-starred events: Timothy McVeigh's twisted
patriotism and disdain for "collateral damage," the Gingrich
Revolution in its heyday, and the Clinton Presidency at the
furthest point of its most rightward triangulation.

4 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7838-S7839 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Cohen).
5 See 141 CONG. REc. S7877 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob
Dole) (commending President Clinton, based on his statements on LarryKing Live, "for
finally coming around to the view that habeas reform is an essential ingredient of any
serious anti-terrorism plan").
6 See 141 CONG. REC. S7850 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (reporting Senate vote on
key amendment to remove what became 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) from the bill, which was
defeated by a 53-46 margin).
7 Clinton Hits Congress for Inaction on Terrortsm Bill, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Apr. 13, 1996, 1996 WL 3837617 CPresident Bill Clinton on Saturday used the
approaching anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing to slam the U.S. Congress for
failing to pass anti-terrorism legislation.").
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Timothy McVeigh was, of course, a federal prisoner
executed under the authority of the Umted States. Yet, the
death penalty process that AEDPA undertakes to make more
"effective" is, by and large, the one available for federal court
review of state criminal convictions and sentences. Indeed,
federal capital prisoner McVeigh was twice removed from the
category of prisoners who suffer AEDPA's most disastrous
"collateral damage," namely state prisoners serving
noncapbtalsentences. Although AEDPA's many complications
and interpretive conundrums are, at times, a boon to relatively
well-represented capital habeas corpus petitioners, they are a
mghtmarish obstacle course for unrepresented (i.e., for the vast
majority of) noncapital petitioners.8 Ironically, therefore,
Congress sold AEDPA to the public on the ground that it would
deprive Timothy McVeigh of the type of post-conviction review
that, as a federal capital prisoner, he was never in a position to
receive. Moreover, even if McVeigh had been granted that
review, he had every intention of waiving it in his selfproclaimed quest for a swift and public martyrdom at the
hands of his obliging government oppressors.
B.

Some Background

So, what did AEDPA do to make the death penalty more
"effective" in the thirty-eight states that use it?9 Here, again,
some background is important.
8 Capital habeas prisoners represent a minuscule proportion of the
federal habeas corpus petitions filed each year. See James S. Liebman, The
Overproductionof Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2043-44 n.64 (2000) (documenting
that only about 200 (2%) of the approximately 10,000 federal habeas petitions filed
each year involve prisoners sentenced to death).
9 The states with the death penalty are: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.

20011

AEDPA AND ERROR DETECTION

As long as there have been federally enforceable
protections for state criminal defendants in the Umted States,
its statutes have provided convicted defendants with a right,
on demand, to plenary review on the merits in an Article III
court of any claimed deprivation of those protections. 10 I state
the point categorically because, on the eve of AEDPA's
adoption, it was a categorical legal fact. Since 1867 in many
such cases, and since the second decade of the twentieth
century in nearly all such cases, federal habeas corpus has
been the mechamsm for providing convicted prisoners with
plenary review as of right of claimed deprivations of federal
legal protections."
Since its inception in thirteenth century England,
habeas corpus has been a principal mechamsm for testing the
legality of custody at the hands of the state. During most of
that period, habeas corpus was defined by two fundamental
principles: First, there were no time limits on a prisoner's
capacity to test the legality of his incarceration. Second, res
judicata did not apply No matter how many prior petitions had
2
failed, the prisoner could try, try again.1
By 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court had cut back on the
res judicata principles when state prisoners sought successive
federal court review of the legality of state convictions. Yet,
until 1996 the Court held firm to two principles. First, there
were no time limits on federal habeas review 13 Second, a state
court's prior adjudication of the legality of a state prisoner's
conviction or sentence had no binding legal effect on the federal
court's obligation to independently assess the legality of state
action leading to incarceration, and to grant relief if the action
was inconsistent with federal law in effect when the action
occurred.14
10

See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttack on

HabeasCorpus/DirectReview Parity,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2055-94 (1992).
11 See id. at 2063-81.
12 On the history of habeas corpus m this regard, see 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN &
RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 28.2(a)-(b) n.3
(3d ed. 1998) (discussing history of treatment of successive habeas corpus petitions m
England and United States).
13 See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (reiterating that
the filing of habeas corpus petitions was not subject to time limits).
14 See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1985); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 458 (1953).
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This is not to say that, before 1996, the Supreme Court
had placed no limits on habeas review On the contrary, in
addition to limits on successive federal challenges to state
custody, 15 the Court enforced a strict procedural default bar on
claims and evidence not properly preserved in state court
proceedings, 16 and confined habeas appeals to substantial
17
federal questions.
C.

Some Provisions of AEDPA

is
In 1996 came the Effective Death Penalty Act. It
included the following five preclusive provisions, listed here
from least to most significant:
First, AEDPA made it even harder for state prisoners to
appeal district court demals of habeas relief. 19 Second, the Act
made the Supreme Court's already strict standard for filing
second or successive federal petitions challenging a state
criminal verdict nearly impossible to satisfy 20 Third, the Act
made it even harder for the prisoner to present facts in federal
court that his or her lawyer had (even incompetently) failed to
21
present in state court.
Fourth-and here, I think, Congress' cleaver moved
from flesh to bone-AEDPA imposed a one year statute of
limitations on the filing of federal habeas corpus. 22 As I have
already mentioned, this time bar was unprecedented in the
history of habeas corpus. Even worse, states can easily lure
prisoners into missing the time bar simply by withholding
lawyers from them at the state post-conviction stage of review
This is because of what may be called "Catch-22, AEDPAstyle," which goes something like this:

I5 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1995); McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991).
16 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478 (1986).
17 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 (1983).
18
AEDPA, supra note 2.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001).
20
Id.§§ 2244(a), 2244(b).
21 Id. § 2254(e)(2).
22
Id. § 2244(d).
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Rule 22-A: You may not get habeas relief unless you
take no more than one year after direct appeal to file a federal
habeas petition. But there's a catch, 22-A: You cannot go
directly and rapidly from state direct review to federal habeas
review Instead you must first file a state post-conviction
23
petition in order to exhaust your state remedies.
Rule 22-B: Luckily, once you file a state post-conviction
petition, that stops the one-year statute of limitations from
running. 24 But there is a catch here, as well-m fact, there are
four catches: Catch 22-B-1: The statute of limitations is not
25
tolled until you actually file a state post-conviction petition.
Catch 22-B-2: To secure that tolling protection and to exhaust
your state remedies, any state post-conviction petition you file
must be "properly filed," and it must raise all the claims you
want reviewed on federal habeas. 26 Catch 22-B-3: Properly
filing that petition, and raising all the necessary claims,
requires a lawyer. 27 Catch 22-B-4: Neither AEDPA, nor the
U.S. Constitution, nor state law in most states, gives you a
right to the lawyer you need to navigate the other three
catches-or even to understand that they exist in the tangled
verbal thicket that is AEDPA.28
Tins description of AEDPA is neither fanciful nor
hypothetical. At this moment, there are more than thirty
prisoners on death row in Alabama who have not yet
received-and now may be tune-barred from receiving-any
state or federal post-conviction review of their death sentences
29
due to the lack of any lawyers to represent them.
That's not all. There is, in addition, a fifth and yet more
preclusive AEDPA provision: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 30 Section
2254(d) provides that a federal habeas judge (1) who has
jurisdiction to determine the legality of a state court criminal
verdict, and (2) who finds that the state court nposed that
23

Id. §§ 2254(b), 2254(c).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(2).
25
Id.
26
Id. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

27 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE
§ 7.2 (4th ed.) (forthcoming 2001).
28
See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
29
Death Row Inmates Lack Lawyers, Says Legal Agency, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
Mar. 25, 2001, http://www.bhamnews.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
30 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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verdict in violation of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted at
the tne of the state court's ruling, nonetheless cannot deprive
that unconstitutional state court decision of its legal force and
effect-unless the federal court concludes that the state
decision was not just wrong as a matter of federal law, but was
unreasonably wrong. 31 Sometimes, that is, a federal court will
have jurisdiction to review a state court decision of law, will
conclude that the decision violated supreme federal law, and
yet will be required to give legal effect to that illegal decision,
including where the effect is a human being's execution.
D.

The Last Provisin's Unconstitutinality:An Example

Suppose, for example, a retarded man, let's call him
John Paul Penry, is on death row in Texas. When he was first
tried capitally, his jury was told of ins substantial retardation
but was then given oral and written instructions to sentence
him to die if the jurors answered three questions in the
affirmative. None of the questions gave any mitigating effect to
32
a capital defendant's retardation.
Suppose that in 1989, Mr. Penry's case reaches the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Pumshment Clause leaves states free to
execute retarded people like Mr. Penry, but only if the jury that
sentenced him to die was required to give some mitigating
effect to his retardation. Because the jury instructions at the
state criminal trial withheld that mitigating effect, Mr. Penry's
83
death sentence had to be reversed.
Assume further that Mr. Penry gets a new trial at
which he presents the same evidence of substantial retardation
as at the first trial. And suppose the trial judge gives the same
written instructions: "Sentence Penry to death if you, the
jurors, answer three questions in the affirmative," none of
which gives any mitigating effect to retardation. Assume as
well that the judge gives the same oral instructions, but
supplements them with two sentences that someone with twice
31 See id., as interpreted in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-05 (2000).
32 One of the questions did, however, give aggravating effect to his retardation,
making it a good reason to sentence hin to die.
33 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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Penry's I.Q., and with powers of textual interpretation worthy
of Antonin Scalia, could understand as follows: "If you want to,
jurors, you may rely upon the evidence of retardation as a
reason to violate your oath and answer any one of the three
questions 'no' even though in point of fact the truthful answer
is 'yes.' " Suppose that-needless to say-the jury answers all
three questions "yes," and again sentences Penry to die.
On appeal, the state courts affirm, prompting Penry to
petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, and the case
eventually reaches the U.S. Supreme Court a second time.
Citing the new § 2254(d), Texas responds that, "You may not
exercise your habeas jurisdiction to overturn Mr. Penry's death
sentence, even if you believe it was imposed in violation of the
Eighth Amendment as you previously interpreted it in Penry's
earlier case, unless you determine that in addition to being
wrong, the state court decision was 'unreasonablywrong.' -34
At this point, a Supreme Court Justice, let's call him
Breyer, peers down from the bench over his reading glasses,
and asks Texas's attorney- "You mean to say that if we find
that the trial judge violated the U.S. Constitution as we
previously interpreted it in this very case, we cannot enforce
the Constitution, or our own mandate, unless we find that the
trial judge acted 'crazy,' as well as unconstitutionally? Can that
be constitutional?" To which the state's attorney gives his slam
dunk reply '"Yes, your honor, that is precisely what Congress
provided when it adopted section 2254(d). And it surely is
constitutional because that's just how this Court interpreted
35
the provision last year in a case called Williams v. Taylor"
The Penry case is not my invention, of course, but a real
case recently argued in the Supreme Court for the second time,
under the circumstances as I described them.36 And in a case
decided last year called Williams v. Taylor,3 7 the Supreme
34 The quoted statement is a paraphrase of Transcript of Oral Argument,
Penry v. Johnson, No. 00-6677, available at 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 31, at *40-41
(Mar. 27, 2001).
35 Id. (statement by Justice Breyer during oral argument that "r worned
about the implications" for "the authority of this Court in criminal cases" if section
2254(d)(1) is interpreted and employed in a manner that results in the Supreme
Courts "issu[ing] mandates and
those mandates could be ignored by a state as long
as the way in which the state ignores the mandate commends itself to some reasonable
lawyer
though most reasonable lawyers decide the contrary.").
36 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
37 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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Court indeed interpreted § 2254(d) to limit habeas corpus relief
to only "unreasonable" constitutional violations-while
declining to give Mr. Williams' constitutional objection to that
interpretation the time of day 8
But Williams notwithstanding, there is a serious
constitutional problem with the Court's interpretation of §
2254(d).3 9 Let me briefly explain why that is so, based on a
careful study of the drafting of the Constitution 4° and of the
41
Court's Article III jurisprudence since then.
As the likes of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and James Wilson structured the Constitution, and as the
Court's classic separation of powers decisions have understood
and maintained that structure ever since, the most
fundamental role of Article III courts is to assure that state
law, including state decisional law, does not contravene the
U.S. Constitution and other federal law 42 As Hamilton wrote
in The FederalistNo. 80, Article III courts' principal role is to
exercise "some effectual power
to restrain or correct" state
court "infractions" of federal law and thereby to enforce the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 43 According to the
Supremacy Clause: "This Constitution and the Laws of the
Umted States
and all Treaties ...shall be the supreme Law
of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."44
The Court has repeatedly construed these provisions in
such landmark cases as Marbury v. Madison,45 Martin v.
Hunters Lessee,46 Cohens v. Virgnma, 47 Abelman v. Booth,48
38

Id. at 405-06.
See James S. Liebman & William F Ryan, "Some Effectual Power" The
Quantity and Quality of DecisionmakingRequired of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696 (1998).
40 See id. at 705-73.
41 See td. at 773-850.
42
Id. at 705-72.
43 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
44
U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
45 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
47 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
48 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
39
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Crowell v. Benson,4 9 and Yakus v. United States.50 Together,
these decisions define the core attribute of the federalsupremacy-inflected "judicial power" that Article III insulates
from congressional control or limitation. That core attribute is
a federal court's "effectual power," when granted jurisdiction
over a matter, to deny force and effect to state decisional and
51
other law of the land as of the tune the state law was made.
And yet, as Justice Breyer seemed to recognize at the Penry
oral argument, 52 it is precisely that "effectual power" that §
2254(d), as interpreted in Williams, 53 withholds from federal
54
habeas courts.
II.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT: AEDPA AND ERROR
DETECTION

I could say more about the impressive constitutional
authority that lines up against the interpretation of § 2254(d)
in Williams.5 5 Instead, I want to use the results of a study of
the death penalty in the United States, from 1973 to the eve of
AEDPA's adoption in 1995,56 to assess the extent to which all
five of AEDPA's preclusive provisions contribute to the
"effective death penalty" to which AEDPA aspires.
A.

Was the DeathPenalty "Safe and Effectwe" Pror to
AEDPA?

"Effectiveness" conjures up images of productivity So,
for a moment, consider the death penalty as a system that
generates a product-death verdicts-that, if made correctly,
are a reliable and effective means of imposing that penalty on
49 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
50 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
51 See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 39, at 773-850.

52 See supra note 36 (quoting Justice Breyer's concern).
53 Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
54
See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 39, at 864-84.
55 See id.
56 James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995 (2000), [hereinafter A Broken System],. available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_finaLpdf, abridged and reprinted
in James S. Liebman et al., CapitalAttrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases 1973-1995,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000) [hereinafter CapitalAttrition].
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only those offenders for whom state and federal law permit
death as a punishment. One method used by enterprises to
measure the reliability and effectiveness of their products is to
track the results of their own quality-control inspections and
their products' consequent success and scrap rates.
In June 2000, my colleagues and I published a study
using this same method to gauge the reliability and
effectiveness of the death penalty in the United States from
1973 to 1995. 57 During that period, nearly 6,000 death
sentences rolled down the penological production lines of
thirty-four states towards the three sets of quality control
reviews mentioned earlier: direct appeal in state supreme
courts, post-conviction review in state trial and appellate
courts, then habeas corpus review in federal trial and appellate
58
courts.
A painstaking count of the results of that three-stage
inspection process revealed that forty-one percent of the nearly
4,600 death verdicts reviewed on direct review were sent back
due to findings of reversible error. Of the fifty-nie percent of
those verdicts that went on for a second inspection, at least ten
percent more were sent back to be reworked or scrapped,
leaving about fifty-three percent of the original death sentences
available for the third and final inspection. Of these an
additional forty percent were found to be too flawed to carry
out. 59 Overall only thirty-two percent of the original capital
judgments were approved for execution, while sixty-eight
percent were reversed. 60 Error rates were ugh and persistent
across time and space, surpassing fifty percent in all but three
6
years and two states studied. '
Chronically high error or reversal rates might suggest
two conclusions about our death penalty system. First, capital
trials are not "safe" because they do not provide a reliable
mechanism for identifying the murders for which death is a
proper punishment. Second, our capital system is not
"effective" because it is not a satisfactory deterrent or

57 Id.
58 See A Broken System, supra note 56, at 18-22, 29.

59 See id. at 29-30.
60 Id.
61 See id.

at 8.
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retributive mechanism for responding to those murders. We
concluded that the capital system is "broken" in both these
ways.
1. Not Safe
Answers to the following four questions led us to
conclude that chronically high reversal rates in capital cases
provide strong evidence of an excessive risk that capital
verdicts condemn people for crimes they did not commit, or for
crimes for which death is not a lawful penalty
First, can we trust the inspectors? Do their incentives
dispose them to be generous or stingy with their findings of
reversible error 9 That ninety percent of the thousands of
reversals were by elected state judges, 62 and that Republican
appointees to the federal bench were a majority of the judges
voting to overturn the death verdicts in over half of the
remaining ten percent of cases, 63 suggest that the judges
finding reversible error had no undue propensity to overturn
trial verdicts absent serious problems.
Second, how serious are the bases for reversal? Here, we
have data for the second and third inspection stages. At those
two stages, seventy-five to eighty percent of the reversals arose
from violations requiring the prsoner to prove either inherent
prejudice or an actual probability that the violation led to the
wrong outcome-tough standards that go directly to
unreliability Although we do not have comparable information
about the first (state direct appeal) inspection stage, there is no
reason to think that the errors it detects are substantially less
serious. On the contrary, the first review stage probably
screens out many of the most glaring errors.
Third, do outcomes in fact change when errors are cured
on retrial? Here, our data are from the state post-conviction

62
63

See id. at 9.

Our data show that appointees of Republican presidents were a majority of
the judges at the last stage of review who voted to reverse capital verdicts in fifty-four
percent of the federal habeas corpus proceedings in which death verdicts were
overturned between 1973 and 1995. (data on file with author).
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stage, and reveal that on retrial fully eighty-two percent of the
reversals resulted in a sentence less than death, including
64
seven percent ending in acquittals.
Finally, the persistence of error over time, across
jurisdictions, and at all three stages of review, suggests serious
deficiencies-as does the fact that even three inspections
sometimes are not enough. Too often, all three sets of courts
have approved men and women for execution whom film
makers, reporters, undergraduate students or (in one case) a
65
burglarhave later shown to be innocent.
2. Not Effective
The results are no more encouraging from the
perspective of the nation's two-third's majority of death penalty
supporters, who look to that penalty for swift and sure
retribution and deterrence. For, as a result of lugh error rates
and the intensive review needed to catch and cure it, only
thirty-two percent of capital verdicts getting full review during
the study period were approved for executon. 66 Even that
paltry figure vastly overstates the success rate because most
cases at any given time are stuck in the system, awaiting
review During the twenty-three year study period, the average
time from sentence to execution was nine years.67 Taking into
account the many cases awaiting review, only about six percent
of the death sentences entering the review process during the
twenty-three year study period were approved for execution by
the courts.68 And only five percent of the death sentences were
actually carried out during the period.6 9 Moreover, in any given
year, including 1999 when the nation lethally injected or
electrocuted mnety-eight men and women, the highest number
since 1951, it still never executed more than three percent-
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See A Broken System, supra note 56, at 5.
65 See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).

66 See A Broken System, supra note 56, at 30.

67 See zd.
68 Of the 5760 death sentences imposed during the study period, 362 (6.3%)
were approved for execution by all three levels of reviewing courts. See &d.at 29-30.
69 See id. at 29.
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and, in a typical year, it only executes about 1.3 percent-of
the people on death row 70
Presumably, the retributive or deterrent capacity of the
death penalty requires something more than a one in twenty
chance that any death sentence imposed within a twenty-three
year span will actually be carried out during that period. If this
is so, then the current system is achieving neither retribution
nor deterrence.
B.

Has AEDPA Enhanced the Safety or Effectweness of the
DeathPenalty Since 1996?

These numbers show that on the eve of AEDPA's
adoption, the modern American death penalty was neither
safe, in the sense of being a reliable means of identifying the
people for whom the law allows the death penalty, nor
effective, in the sense of being administered with the swiftness
and sureness needed to achieve its penological goals.
What, then, can we expect AEDPA's effect to be on the
penalty's safety and effectiveness? I say "expect" because we do
not have the data to establish that effect given our study's
culmination in 1995, and given the many years it takes to
identify cases and document their outcomes. But what we
know about the pre-1995 situation and about the AEDPA's
design permits a fair prediction of its effect.
Most crucially, as far as we can tell, there have been no
systematic trial-level improvements that have coincided with
AEDPA's adoption and implementation. On the contrary, in
1995, Congress defunded death penalty resource centers that
theretofore had assisted capital defense lawyers in about
twenty states. 71 The net result of AEDPA, therefore, is to leave
70
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See Iaebman, supranote 8, at 2063-65 & tbl. 4.
See, e.g., Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999,

at 84 ("In 1995, Congress weighed m on the need for speedier executions when it

eliminated the $20 million annual budget for Post-Conviction Defender Organization,
which had provided some of the most sophisticated and effective counsel for death-row
inmates in twenty death-penalty states"); Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the
Post Conviction Defense Organizationsas a Denialof the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L
REV.863 (1996). See also, e.g., Editorial, Death Penalty Blunder, WASH. POST, July 12,
2001 ("The Virgia Supreme Court has adopted guidelines that effectively slash the
fees of court-appointed attorneys in death penalty cases. The move comes at a time
when national attention has been focused on the low quality of counsel in capital
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intact an already, and perhaps increasingly, flawed production
process, while simultaneously complicating, and dimnnishing
the error-detecting capacity of, the quality control process.
AEDPA complicates review, first, because of its poor
drafting. AEDPA's opaque language has proliferated conflicting
interpretations, requiring the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to resolve a conflict in interpretation at least
fourteen times since AEDPA's adoption in 1996, nine of them
in capital cases. 72 Justice Souter certainly was right when he
said for the Court that, in a world of "silk purse" and "sow's
ear" drafting, AEDPA does not belong in the former category 73
AEDPA further complicates matters by adding
litigation steps, rather than cutting them. Because of AEDPA,
virtually every step of a habeas case now proceeds in three
steps, instead of the previous one or two. First, federal habeas
74
courts must decide whether they can even reach the merits;
second, they must resolve the merits-whether the state courts
violated the Constitution; 75 and third, federal courts must
decide the § 2254(d) question-whether the violation was
"unreasonable."76
This proliferation of litigation explains why, since 1996,
the average time from death sentence to execution has risen
from about nine to over twelve years,7 7 and why the only
cases."); Death Row Takes a Toll on Lawyers: Money, Resources Are in Short Supply,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 20, 2001, http://www.nola.com/t-p/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2001) ('After Congress pulled federal funding for post-conviction appeals in
1996, the number of capital cases in Louisiana kept climbing and defense lawyers
working pro bono for death row inmates already were scarce. With urging by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which has put specific death penalty appeals on hold until
the defendants had lawyers, the state responded in 1999 and enacted a law that gives
those on death row the right to representation. But legislators didn't provide the $1.3
million they themselves said was needed for the program.").
72 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 27, at § 3.2 (collecting and discussing the
relevant 73cases).
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
74 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (creating timing bar to reaching merits,
depending upon complex set of rules governing the filing date of habeas petitions).
75 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(d), as interpreted in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404, 412 (2000).

76 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
404, 412 (2000).
77 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Bulletin:

Capital Pumshment 1999, NCJ 184795, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/abstract/cp99htm (last visited June 12, 2001).
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empirical study of the matter-by a think tank run by the
National State Courts Association-found that AEDPA has
exhibited an "almost complete lack of success" in moderating
the burden habeas corpus petitions place on the states.7 8
Existing evidence suggests, therefore, that as of yet AEDPA
has not made the death penalty more "effective," even m the
narrow sense of enabling more death verdicts to clear judicial
inspection and be carried out more quickly
In addition, and more critically, the five AEDPA
provisions discussed above greatly diminish the reliability of
the capital system's review process and of the capital verdicts
that the system produces. To see why tins is so, suppose
AEDPA had caused, or eventually does cause, a speed-up in
executions. Would that by itself mean AEDPA has engendered
a more "effective death penalty" 9 Suppose an airline company
found itself plagued by delays due to its aircrafts' frequent
failure to pass its battery of pre-flight safety checks. Surely,
the vice president in charge of operations would not be
permitted to make those operations more "effective" by
speeding up and truncating the airline's inspections.
Yet, that is precisely the solution to wich AEDPA
aspires. Indeed, AEDPA now achieves the worst of all possible
worlds: without improving, and probably worsening, the death
penalty's "on time" record, AEDPA's reforms have made the
system substantially less safe and reliable. How's that as a
plan for saving Umted Airlines, or Value Jet?
C.

A More Effectwe Solution

Let me close by stating the nonobvious: Cutting back on
post-trial quality control is not the wrong solution. It is simply
the wrong half of the solution to implement first. Making our
death penalty system safe, as well as effective, requires that
we first improve the reliability of the trial process for
producing death sentences, and only then-for the death
sentences that emerge from improved trials-adopt the
streamlined review that these improvements make possible.
78 Fred Cheesman, II et aL, A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts
Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 LAW & POL'Y 89, 90, 95, 99,

105 (2000).
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As far as I can tell, there is only one past or current
death row inmate whose case approximates that rational
solution: Timothy McVeigh. For all one can tell, he had a
superb trial, at which he was represented by top-notch defense
lawyers, prosecuted by highly professional government
lawyers, and watched over by a careful and strong-willed trial
judge. 79 Who, then, can doubt McVeigh's conclusion that there
was little to be gamed from the review process he chose to
waive? But who, also, can doubt the supreme irony that
Timothy McVeigh-alone among 3,700 other death row
mmates8 0-has gotten his wish for the swift, reliable, and
effective death penalty that the U.S. Congress in his name has
withheld from everyone else9

79 For discussions of the trial, see, e.g., STEPHEN JONES & PETER ISRAEL,
OTHERS UNKNOWN: THE OKLAHOMA BOMBING CASE AND CONSPIRACY (1998); LOU
MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH AND THE
OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING (2001); Stephen Jones & Jennifer Gideon, United States v.
McVeigh, Defending "TheMost Hated Man in America," 51 OKLA. L. REV. 617 (1998);
Peter Atmn & Tom Morgenthau, The Verdict: Death, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1997, at 40;
We Did the Best We Could, NAT'L L.J. June 30, 1997, at A6.
80 NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A.,
Spring 2001, at 7, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DeathRowUSAl.html.

